able water seepage and ill placed wells.l
For under the present system of competitive drainage, the gas energy has not been conserved and even the wells have not been located scientifically on the geologic structure. The fractional ownership of the surface over a geologic unit of oil and gas has created a vicious system of competitive drilling. The location of wells has been determined by the property lines of the surface regardless of subsurface contours, and the utilization of the gas energy has been left to the whim of the individual producer. The bringing in of a discovery well precipitates intensive drilling on surrounding property. Wells are located close to property lines for the recognized purpose of draining as much oil as possible from neighboring lands.12 The neighboring property owners are forced to counter with an off-set well on their side of the boundary line. From then on off-set to off-set follows off-set until the limits of the field are proved.13 One recalcitrant operator has it in his power to set the pace of drilling and to determine the spacing of wells. Thus in the Oklahoma City Pool the attempts of the majority first to curtail immediate drilling and then to limit the drilling to forty-acre tracts were frustrated by one or two operators who insisted upon immediate drilling on ten-acre tracts. The result was the bringing in of over seven hundred wells in about a year's time.l4
The race in drilling is spurred on by the advantages gained by the first wells 'in. These wells secure great flush production by utilizing the full latent energy of the field. Experience has shown that off-set wells to big producers rarely attain equal flush production. Furthermore, the reckless dissipation of gas energy causes a rapid permanent diminution of pressure in the entire field, decreasing the possible recovery of the other wells, and of
Numerous technical descriptions in varying detail may be found. See for example, MILLER, op. cit. supra note 10; AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF PE-TROLEUM GEOLOGISTS, STRUCTURE OF TYPICAL AMERICAN OIL FIELDS (A Symposium, 2 vols. 1929); AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, PETROLEUM FACTS AND FIGURES (1929); AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF MINING AND METALLURGICAL ENGINEERS, PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY (5 vols. 1925-30); BEAL AND LEWIS, SOME PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE PRODUCTION OF OIL WELLS (Bureau of Mines 1929)
. 12 The situation has been aptly described in a colorful statement by H. L. Doherty, long a proponent of unit operation of oil fields: "What is called competition in an oil field is no more competition than is a run on a bank. In fact a run on a bank is not as much 'cut throat competition' as in an oil field because all the depositors are trying to get their own money, and in an oil field the operators are trying to get not only their own oil but everybody else ' 
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[Vol. 41 the field as a whole. And when wells located high on the structure are allowed to flow, the ratio of gas to oil is higher than in wells tapping the pool lower down in the pay sand. This high oilgas ratio fails to utilize the full lifting power of the gas energy. In the early days of oil development the conservationist was concerned largely with the waste of natural gas by allowing it to blow to the air; now with a more complete understanding of oil well mechanics, operators are concerned with the waste of both oil and gas arising from the improper handling of gas energy.15
In the ill-planned production of the competitive system as much as eighty to ninety percent of the oil is lost and abandoned in the sands,16 natural gas is blown to the air, and the function of gas energy disregarded in the mad scramble for "more oil now." Instances of shocking waste are accepted as a matter of course in the United States. In Texas two wells on the top of a dome were allowed to blow dry gas in the hope that oil would eventually be drawn up. After blowing for thirty-four and eighteen days respectively, and expending approximately 250,000,000 cubic feet, oil appeared; one well yielded ten barrels a day, the other twenty-six.7 Recently at Kettleman Hills in California a billion cubic feet of gas a day, enough to supply the industrial needs of San Francisco and the whole northern part of the state, has been allowed to escape into the air.18 The concomitant loss of gas energy in such cases brought forth the California oil-gas ratio law.19 Physical waste above ground likewise is generous; "On November 1, 1926, the Seminole Pool was producing more oil than the pipe lines could handle and the producers did not have the steel storage built to take care of the surplus oil, consequently some of the oil was going on the ground and down the creeks." 20 Even where hastily constructed earthen pits have supplemented steel tanks there has been great waste through the seepage of oil.21 Further waste constantly occurs by evaporation from the huge stocks in storage.
The physical losses of oil and gas and the waste of gas energy have been accompanied by huge economic costs. The intense duplication of wells has saddled the industry with a great overhead of fixed charges. While lifting and storage costs may be delayed-if the oil can be kept in the ground until a market is found-drilling costs are already incurred and add to the total costs of production even though production is restricted.22 This is graphically portrayed by the Oklahoma City Pool, a typical example of competitive drilling. There, some seven hundred and sixty-five wells, costing approximately $125,000,000, have developed a potential production twenty times that which can be absorbed by the market, so that the wells were reduced to operating less than five percent of the time until the martial law edict shut down the field.23 In a similar instance of competitive drilling, that of the Seminole area, it has been estimated that a cooperative program would have slashed development costs from $152,800,000 to $82,875,000.24 These economic wastes have made the industry grimly aware of the need for "conservation."
Despite these enormous wastes in exploitation, in the past decade there has been an excess in production, with a steadily increasing potential surplus.25 Because of competitive drilling and drainage, oil production is not responsive to price control. The synchronous discovery of many new pools which were at once forced to peak production by the competitive system has flooded the market. Increased stocks either in storage above ground or held back beneath have brought with them a steadily declining price, until production from the vast new East Texas Field during the past summer caused the final collapse of the price structure.2 Attempts to curtail production in the old fields were of no avail in the face of free flush flow from new fields. Further demoralization of the price structure from further discoveries already indicated by existing data is imminent, so long as the present system controls.
A program of conservation strictly to eliminate waste in production would incidentally have a beneficial effect on the price structure; it is this and not mere altruism that guides the industry which is, after all, on a production for profit basis. Scientific production would curtail the great flush production of the new fields and thus avoid sudden bursts of supply. Limitations on the number of wells would also reduce the costs of production. But the mere adoption of such conservation tactics would produce an 25 At the present time there are over 650,000,000 barrels in surface storage. Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association, Monthly Bulletins give current figures. The tremendous volume pinched back in "underground storage" cannot be calculated with accuracy. 26 In Texas the price actually fell below ten cents a barrel while twenty five cent oil was common throughout the mid-continent region.
[Vol. 41anomalous situation; unrestrained use of improved technology would increase rather than decrease the total potential recovery of each producing area and still leave the surplus problem. So the industry pushes "conservation" a step further. The financial losses due to the low prices that "overproduction" yields are seen as "economic waste," fully as pernicious in social effect as physical waste. Too rapid depletion of our natural resources likewise suggests the value of a curtailment of production.2 So waste now "in addition to its ordinary meaning, shall include economic waste, underground waste, surface waste, and waste incident to the production of crude oil or petroleum in excess of transportation or marketing facilities or reasonable market demands." 28 Governmental regulation and assistance has thus become necessary to rectify the situation. Action has been of two kinds. Emergency measures have been taken to reduce the present surplus. Public oil lands have been withdrawn by the federal government from exploitation.29 State administrative bodies under conservation statutes are setting the daily quota for each field within the state and are prorating that quota among the wells. The extreme of exigent state actiont has taken the form of a complete shut down of flush wells by martial law. Secondly, a more fundamental reorganization of production through cooperative agreements and unit operation is projected. These restrictions on production are achieved either by voluntary agreements between the operators in an oil pool or by compulsion through state action. 
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Such restraints, made in the name of "conservation," cut athwart both property laws, delimiting but protecting the rights of individual operators and landowners, and anti-trust legislation designed to maintain free competition and low prices to the consumer. In eliminating "waste", conservation measures cannot abridge the constitutional rights of private property, however benignant their purpose. And since the consequent restriction of production will also affect both the total income of the producer and the costs of petroleum products to the consumer, the legality of the restraint of trade must be considered. The legal problems thus involved are complicated. To grasp fully their implications it is essential to keep in mind the manifold purposes of the "conservation" program now envisaged by the petroleum industry. They may be summarized: (1) Waste must be eliminated, and petroleum must be utilized with the greatest economic benefit. (2) Restrictions on production must assure each operator and royalty owner his proportionate share and not constitute a taking of property without due process of law. (3) Conservation must not constitute a device to control prices in contravention of the anti-trust statutes.
II Legal Foundations of Competition in Oil Production
Although the oil industry is not alone in suffering from "excess of capacity," in perhaps no other industry has it been property law that has conspired to prevent the adjustment of supply to demand.30 From the beginning petroleum production in the United States became enmeshed in a tangled legal web which forced immediate exploitation. Under the theories of property law applied to oil and gas, any delay in development by an operator has subjected him to the two-fold danger of having the oil and gas drained off by adjoining operators and also of having the lease, under which oil lands are generally developed, declared "forfeit," "terminated" or "abandoned" to the lessor.
The danger which an operator faces from adjoining property owners arises from a strange quirk of property law concerning the ownership of oil and gas. In all states surface owners over a common pool may take and keep all the oil and gas which can be taken from their wells, regardless of possible drainage from 30 Undoubtedly other basic industries suffering from "over-expansion" have found readjustment difficult due to overhead costs, immobility of capital and labor, or the institutional patterns of their own structure. Even if an operator does not face the dangers of drainage by others, his position as lessee is made hazardous by the specialized property law of oil and gas leases. Whether the courts have been led by a desire to protect the small landowner against the big producer or whether, as some have avowed, they have thought it sound public policy that oil should be "produced" rather than "held for speculation," they have developed a body of law tending to force immediate exploitation.37 The development of oil lands generally has been carried on, because of the speculative nature of petroleum discovery, by the grant of a lease to an operator in consideration of his covenant to pay the lessee a one-eighth royalty of the petroleum products produced. In the early leases duction of oil and gas because of the difference between solid and fluid minerals and because of the different conditions under which they are found and brought to the surface." Strangely enough, this reasoning has not been applied where a lessor has sought damages or specific performance of a lessee's express or implied covenant to protect the leased premises against drainage. In such cases the assumed problematical character of drainage in general has not been regarded as an insuperable obstacle to granting either equitable or legal relief. See cases cited infra note 47.
36 See Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., supra note 35, at 365, 65 Atl. at 802: "The right of every landowner to drill a well on his own land at whatever spot he may sec fit certainly must be conceded.... He may crowd the adjoining farms so as to enable him to draw the oil and gas from them. What then, can his neighbor-do? Nothing, only go and do likewise. He knows it is wild and will run away if it finds an opening and it is his business to keep it at home. This may not be the best rule; but neither the legislature nor our highest court has given us any better. No doubt many thousands of dollars have been expended in 'protecting lines' in oil and gas territory that would not have been expended if some rule had existed by which it could have been avoided. (1896), in which the court said that "such leases are construed most strictly against the lessee and favorable to the lessor." Any other construction was regarded as "preventing the use and transfer of property, the development of the country, and promoting and furthering monopoly." And it was further declared that since it is to the interest of both lessor and lessee that a productive well "be continuously operated until its exhaustion" and "forfeiture for non-development or delay is essential to private and public interests in relation to the use and alienation of property," the same rule of construction applies to both express and implied conditions. Similarly in Parisk Fork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co., 51 W. Va. 583, 42 S. E. 655 (1902), the court favors a rule of construction "which discourages tying up and rendering unproductive vast fields of mineral wealth, construes every contract and lease as to both lessor and lessee so as to best promote production, development and progress, and frowns upon every attempt to evade it as being in contravention of both good morals and public policy. 42 Even where a lease purports to demise the land for the purpose of producing oil or to assign and convey the oil (as opposed to the mere right to explore and produce), it has been held that although the lessee's interest vests on execution of the lease, nevertheless the estate secured is only a "terminable fee with possibility of reverter to the grantor" to be terminated upon any abandonment of. oil and gas development either before or after discovery. (1913) , in which the court regarded the clause extending the term if oil and gas was produced during the exploratory term as a forfeiture provision and applied the doctrine that equity abhors a forfeiture. A provision requiring that lessees shall drill cr pay rentals has likewise sometimes been regarded as a forfeiture provision requiring affirmative action on the part of the lessor to cancel the lease. Walker, op. cit. supra, 556 et seq. Yet since equity seems to regard an oil and gas lease apart from ordinary leases and often does not shrink from declaring them forfeit, a delaying lessee still finds himself in an extremely precarious position even under a so called "or" lease or in a jurisdiction adopting the West Virginia view as to the nature of an "unless" clause. See cases cited note 43, infra.
43 Thus in the leading case of Munroe v. Armstrong, supra note 40, at 310, it was said: "Forfeiture for non-development or delay is essential to private interests in relation to the use and alienation of property. In such cases as this equity follows the law. In general equity abhors a forfeiture, but not when it works equity and protects a landowner from a lessee whose lease is of no value until developed, except for a purpose foreign to the agreement." This is clearly the rule with respect to express covenants for exploration, payment of rentals, diligent operation, and protection against drainage where the power of forfeiture for breach of such covenants is contracted for. See SUMMERS, op the drilling of a well for oil or gas are not commenced on said land on or before one year from this date, this lease shall terminate as to both parties, unless the lessee shall, on or before one year from this date, pay or tender to the lessor" a rental which will cover "the privilege of deferring the commencement of drilling operations for the period of one year." 44 But the modern lessee has not, by assuming an additional charge, avoided the duty of off-setting neighboring wells 45 ket.4 Furthermore, since his lease remains "in force for a term of years and as long thereafter as oil, gas, casinghead gas, casinghead gasoline or any of them is or can be produced," 49 the lessee must seek production within the exploratory period to keep his lease alive.50 And since leases now generally provide for a "delay rental" 51 for each year during which exploration is postponed, this overhead cost adds to the pressure to produce.
During a period of scarcity, these legal foundations of the productive system were of no great concern to the industry. Now when scarcity economics have given way to "excess capacity," the industry in its attempt to cut production finds itself forestalled by this property law relating to oil and gas. Had production beer, organized under a law of horizontal severance,52 whereby the operator became the owner, the present situation would not have been complicated by the clash between landowner and operator which has buttressed the off-set system and forced diligent operation. The lease system, however, has become so firmly entrenched that any plan of reorganization involves not 51 See "Midcontinent 88." Some states have even gone so far as to hold that an implied covenant of exploration in all leases permits a lessor to refuse delay rental and demand an exploratory well. MERRILL, op. cit. supra note 43, § § 19-29. And a "drill or pay" clause when unaccompanied by a "surrender" provision was held to be only for the benefit of the lessor with the result that the lessee could only escape paying rental for the entire exploratory term by finding and producing oil or gas. See SUMMERS, op. cit. supra note 31, at 342 n. 33. 52 In states like Texas where oil and gas is owned in situ, there may be be a conveyance of oil and gas under a theory of horizontal severance. But in looking through form to substance, courts are quick to seize upon any scheme of paying the purchase price by royalties as evidence of an intention .to make a lease. See Walker, op. cit. supra note 41. enacted to regulate the use of oil and gas lands. All the producing states have laws requiring that abandoned wells be plugged and that new wells be properly cased to prevent water intrusion and gas or oil leakage which would injure the entire pool. In some states drilling has been forbidden within a given distance of a railroad right-of-way for reasons of public safety. For the same stated reason various zoning ordinances have prohibited or limited town lot drilling. The use of natural gas in flambeau lights and for the production of carbon black has been prohibited as "wasteful." Such exercise of the police power has long been accepted as matter of course.53
The first constitutional test of such regulations came in 1900 in Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiactn.54 Indiana, believing that its industrial prosperity depended upon a continuous supply of gas, passed a statute, ostensibly designed as a fire safety measure, which prohibited the blowing of natural gas to the air. An oil producer alleged that he was being deprived of his property without due process of law since he could not produce his oil without blowing gas for which he could find no profitable market. The Indiana Supreme Court, ignoring the safety feature, upheld the statute as a public welfare measure. Upon appeal to the Federal Supreme Court, the Indiana court was upheld in a lengthy opinion by Mr. Justice White. As sometimes happens there is no concerted agreement as to the basis of the Court's decision. Although Mr. Justice White stated that one having the right to drill could reduce all he could get to possession without violating the rights of other surface owners, he also stated that-"the use by one of his power to convert a part of the common fund to actual possession may result in an undue proportion being attributed to one of the possessors of the right, to the detriment of others, or by waste by one or more to annihilation of the rights of the remainder. Hence it is that the legislative power . . . can be manifested for the purpose of protecting all the collective owners, by securing a just distribution, to arise from the enjoyment by them of their privilege to reduce to possession, and to reach the like end by preventing waste." 55 Foremost among the doubts left by this case is whether legislation designed to regulate production to protect the correlative rights of the surface owners of a pool without the element of waste is constitutional. 
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Subsequent decisions present no clear-cut analysis of the interrelated bases of police power: (1) to protect the general public welfare by a conservation of natural resources, and (2) to protect the correlative rights of the collective owners. Although the police power is usually invoked by the courts to sustain legislative acts to protect the public health, safety and welfare, there is another aspect of police power which justifies limitations upon liberty and property at common law and in equity to protect others in the enjoyment of their property.;5 Under this aspect of the police power, summed up in the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, the more flagrant infringements upon the property rights of collective owners in a gas pool can be restrained even without legislation. Thus in Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Company,57 a gas company appealed to equity and secured an injunction restraining a rival company possessing other sources of supply from unnecessarily depleting the pressure of a common pool by burning gas at the well. But where the common law does not adequately protect adjacent property owners in the full enjoyment of their property, the legislature may exercise the police power to protect such owners. When such legislation is passed, the question of reasonableness constitutes the only fact for judicial determination.58 Such measures run a different gauntlet of constitutional attack from that exercise of the police power designed to protect the general public interest. No proof of public interest is necessary.
The statute involved in the Ohio Oil Co. case might be supported on either basis of the police power: either as protection of the public interest in a rapidly wasting natural resource, or as protection of the property of collective owners.59 But the interest of the public in the nation's natural resources is not always congruous with the joint enjoyment of collective owners in an oil or gas pool. Thus there have been some regulations which can be sustained only on the ground of the public interest in conservation. Such a case is Walls v. Midland Carbon Co.60 in which the court upheld the state's prohibition of the manufacture of carbon black from natural gas without utilizing the heat units contained in the gas for domestic or industrial purposes. A case involving practically the same set of facts and usually 56 is often said to turn upon the distinction between ownership in situ and ownership by reduction to possession. It seems, however, to depend upon a recognition by the court of a difference in local conditions affecting the public welfare. Whereas in the Midland case the statute was limited in application to situations where a consuming public was ready at hand, in the Rankin case the statute contained no such limitation and the public welfare was not affected since there was no nearby consuming public which could be served.
Other statutes, where the public welfare is apparently not involved, seem valid only as an exercise of the police power for the purpose of protecting owners in the joint enjoyment of a common pool. An oft cited leading case involving this type of legislation is Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.62 in which New York state, in an effort to protect producers from a common pool of carbonated water, succeeded in checking production where gas was obtained although the water was admittedly wasted. Since here the reservoir, unlike an oil pool, replenished itself, the public's interest in conservation played no part in the deci- These cases demonstrate the necessity of distinguishing the alternative doctrines for regulation of production. These are the tools at the state's disposal in acting upon the plea of the industry to extricate it from the economic and legal cul-de-sac into which it has wandered. As the competitive system of production has become more chaotic, and as an increasing surplus has become less and less responsive to price control,64 the state has The Governor, in proclaiming martial law, set forth reasons for his action. The "legacy to the school children"-royalties from public school lands-was being filched by unscrupulous Corporate Lessees. Oil corporations were engaged in secret intrigues with seditious intent allegedly to bribe the legislature, to impeach the governor and to repeal oil conservation laws-"all in order to depress the price of oil and reduce to a minimum the taxable values . . . from its natural resources, in which the state holds a vested property interest." As a result of the depressed price "the percent of the tax collected is too insignificant for the wholesome public benefit." Monopolistic oil corporations had reduced the price so that independent producers could not obtain a "price equal to the cost of production," while the integrated corporations were increasing their earnings. Independent producers had closed down their wells, while the monopolistic corporations continued to produce to the detriment of adjoining lands, "thereby taking property without 'due process of law,' in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." 67 "Some of the inferior Federal Courts have for decades assumed to give corporations a footing above the sovereign states . . . doubtless because of the wvell known fact that many such judges owe their positions to the influence of corporations" and have nullified legislative acts, taking "from the citizen for a time, his constitutional guaranand brought forth an increase in supply, price has not controlled and produced a needed decrease in supply. In so far as proration restricts production of an entire pool to available transportation and storage facilities it does forestall surface waste in flush pools by making it unnecessary for operators without marketing or storage facilities to run oil into earthen pits in self-defense against underground drainage. In fact the proration provisions of the conservation statutes are the result of experiences such as that in the Healdton pool where six hundred thousand barrels of oil stored in earthen pits were washed 79 Since this article was written Governor Murray has reopened the flush fields of Oklahoma for seventy cent oil. 
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out in floods.83 It seems clear that where there is a threatened waste of this nature, proration is a valid exercise of the police power in effecting a conservation of an exhaustible natural resource. But the general public has no special concern in the method of allocating production among the collective owners. This aspect of the proration laws is designed to protect private correlative rights. Since restrictions of production under proration orders promoted the self-interest of the operators, there was no serious challenge of the orders until C. C. Julian, a wild-catter in the Oklahoma City Pool owning a single well located on a quarteracre, demanded the privilege of flowing his well at capacity. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma denied his petition for a writ of prohibition against the Corporation Commission and upheld the statute under which it had acted as "a valid method of preventing waste of the oil of this state." 84 The Champlin Refining Company, an integrated producer, subsequently challenged the method of allocating production among the wells as a deprivation of property without due process of law. The method of allocation in the Oklahoma City Pool is the common one of prorating among all the wells the gross "allowable" as determined by the total "market facilities." The Champlin company, owning producing wells, pipe lines, refineries and retail outlets, alleged that it was able to take oil from its wells in excess of the quota allowed without the commission of any waste. A three-judge federal court, however, also upheld the actions of the Corporation Commission.85 The Court justified the action of the Commission as one calculated to prevent wasteful earthen storage by competitors of the Champlin company who do not have comparable marketing facilities and designed to obtain the greatest ultimate recovery of gas and oil by eliminating underground waste. Since flush flow by the Champlin company would injure others if still shut in, the Court held the restrictions on the Champlin company valid because the right of the state to make regulations "to prevent one from taking in an undue proportion to the detriment of the others, and to prevent one from committing waste to the injury of the rights of the other is well settled." 86 No doubt it is well settled by the earlier cases that the state may prescribe a quota for an entire field to promote conservation for the public welfare. However, since waste detrimental to the public welfare has always been an integral factor in those cases which developed the doctrine of correlative rights as applied to oil and gas,87 it is not clear from the opinions whether ratable apportionment would be sustained in the absence of such waste. The facts of the Chamnplin case for the first time sharply present this issue. Although the three judge court assumed its answer, there seem to be two valid bases for the Supreme Court to uphold the validity of the statute on appeal.
Since under either theory of ownership of petroleum deposits surface owners of a common pool have an unrestricted right to produce, regulations of production must be administered without discrimination to satisfy the guarantee of equal protection of the law. Whereas restraining production within the limits of available transportation and marketing facilities is a conservation measure, prorationing among the wells of a field adapts such regulation to vested property rights. Proration seeks to protect an owner's title, whether in situ or in common, from divestment by legislative denial of an equal opportunity to produce from his property. In the Champlin case, the Court is protecting the property of all by compelling the Champlin company, which can produce beyond its present quota without waste, to gear its production to the pace necessary for all to produce without waste. Thus ratable taking is a necessary incident of the exercise of the police power to achieve conservation.
The other basis for the decision in the Champlin case is suggested by the court's manifest concern in the waste of gas energy as well as the immediate wastes of the substance of oil and gas. The readiness to take judicial notice of recent scientific discovery of the function of gas energy in the extraction of oil points the question of the "ownership" of gas energy and hydraulic head. Since the drive of these forces is an attribute of water, oil and gas in a peculiar structure, claim to it should be correlative. Indeed, were the function of these forces fully appreciated by the courts, ratable taking could be established simply as a doctrine of correlative rights. In fact ratable taking restricted to a scientific rate of flow in order to avoid property damage88 might be predicated on common law principles of lateral support 89 and preservation of natural barriers against flood.90 It would seem that the police power comprehends at least legislative recognition of and protection against such property losses due to the disproportionate using of gas and water drive. The oil-gas ratio law of California was recently sustained by the courts of that state on just such a theory.92 The California statute provided that the production of gas exceeding a reasonable proportion to the amount of oil produced from the same well or wells, even though it appears that the gas produced is being utilized economically, may be restrained if sufficient gas to supplant it can be obtained from other wells. A California producer was restrained from using gas for lifting power in a greater proportion per barrel of oil than the ratio declared reasonable for lifting power by state authorities. The restraint was upheld not on a theory of conservation but solely on the ground that the disproportionate use of gas caused a correlative loss of oil by other owners. The oil-gas ratio law was expected to cut down the current oil production in California since the back pressuring necessary to check the disproportionate flow of gas would not permit wells to run to capacity. Since this indirect method of prorating has not been sufficient and because the measurement of gas flow has proven too difficult of administration, a statute modeled after the Oklahoma proration statute has been passed by the legislature and awaits referendum.
So far in few cases has the administration of proration made a scientific apportionment of the "allowable" between the common owners. In the most recent proration order for the East Texas field the Railroad Commission allocated the "allowable" by setting a flat rate per well.°3 This type of apportionment on a per-well basis fails to take into account the size of the tract upon which any particular well is drilled and is a direct invitation to drill. A well on a small tract like a town lot of the Oklahoma City Pool is permitted to exhaust the common reservoir to the same extent as a well drilled on a forty acre lease. In East Texas record drilling has followed the proration order setting up the per well standard.94 Thus proration substitutes competitive drilling for competitive drainage. On the other hand proration based on surface area does not give due weight to the relative location of tracts on the producing formation. Oil content varies as one progresses from the water line to the gas zone, and allowance of equal volume to tracts of unequal content is inequitable.
Proration according to acreage content has been recommended as the more equitable manner of adjusting these various factors. Since it is now possible to compute with reasonable accuracy the oil and gas content of each tract in a pool,95 it is argued that the flow of wells should be proportionate to the content of each tract regardless of the number of wells. But without an oil-gas ratio law to conserve the lifting power wells located high on the formation may produce a disproportionate amount of gas. With an oil-gas ratio law, those located high on the structure are compelled to conserve the gas for the benefit of those lower down who then secure both the energy and the immediate supply of gas. Compromises weighing the various factors must be made.96
In those fields where political compromise ignores geology in the determination of the measure for-proration, the aid of equity may have to be invoked in order to defeat as unreasonable proration orders not based on scientific data. Furthermore, although prorationing to market facilities may eliminate surface wastes, there is no necessary relation between market facilities and a rate of flow which will conserve gas energy and control water drive. And no mere scheme of prorationing will curtail excess drilling and eliminate the costs of unnecessary off-set wells. Nor will proration insure the proper location of wells on the geologic structure to secure the maximum recovery. These shortcomings of proration can only be obviated by unit operation. Unit operation contemplates a fundamental reorganization of the entire system of competitive production. that from a technical viewpoint the pool should be regarded as the unit, that wells with standardized equipment and installation should be located according to subsurface contours, and that the rate of flow should be determined by the peculiarities of each producing formation. By various voluntary agreements among operators certain pools have been operated somewhat in accordance with these sound engineering principles.
VI
The term "unit operation" has been variously used but "in general it implies that all properties in the respective oil and gas pool shall be consolidated into a single operating unit in some manner that will eliminate the competitive drilling-drainage feature in its development and operation, and will permit the maximum utilization of the expulsive forces native to the reservoir." 97 The most general form now in use has been based on a loose form of co6perative agreement. Under such an agreement the various producers retain the management of their leases; but a joint committee is authorized to regulate in varying degrees the rate and character of development and production from the entire field. The Yates Pool in Texas is, perhaps, the most successful example of cooperative development.98 There the field was divided into one hundred acre units and the total output for the field was prorated between the units. This scheme was placed in effect by order of the Railroad Commission which appointed an umpire for the field. An Advisory Committee consisting of one representative from each company appointed an Executive Committee to work in collaboration with the umpire. This is, in effect, but a highly efficient method of proration; such cooperation achieves some economies, and the comparatively large-sized tracts have minimized the amount of new drilling. A more integrated form of unitization is secured by entrusting operations to a single management. This may be effected either by assignment of leasehold interests to one party who reassigns undivided interests in the whole,99 or by transfer to a trustee.100 Under a merger of leasehold titles, the Pure Oil Company, one of the major lessees, manages fifty-four hundred and fifty acres of the Van Pool for a "joint account." 1'1 This achieves many obvious economies but, as in the cooperative plan, the location of wells is still determined to considerable extent by surface boundary lines and conflicting royalty interests rather than by reservoir structure and content. wells are allowed to flow only until they turn to gas, in this country gas wells are allowed to blow wild in the hope that they may turn to oil. Failure to unitize has been the chief cause of the profligate squandering of gas energy. Even partial unitization has effected huge savings. Under the scheme adopted in the Van Pool, flush flow is expected from five to ten years. If complete competitive conditions had prevailed, the pool, in the opinion of the superintendent in charge of operations, would "have blown its head off in from three to six months."
Despite the fact that unit operation is necessary both to repair these wastes and to control the surplus which has been produced in the face of waste, voluntary unit operation has made but slight progress. Where "enlightened self-interest" fails to demonstrate to a recalcitrant operator that his lot is a happier one within the ranks of the unit, his piratical free-lancing, protected under either legal theory of ownership, permits him to play havoc with any voluntary agreement. Furthermore, the legal weapons at the command of the lessor make participation by an operator in even partial unit operation precarious. For a failure to comply with the implied covenants of diligent operation may result in the termination or forfeiture of an operator's lease. There is the ever-present danger that a court will find that any agreement for partial unit operation curtailing either production or drilling burdens a particular lessor with a disproportionate sacrifice.106 As for complete unit operation, the leasing system makes it impractical as a voluntary proposition. The minute subdivision of the one-eighth royalty interest reserved by the lessor makes it a practical impossibility to secure the unanimous consent of all parties in interest. It is not unusual for single productive quarter sections to have hundreds of royalty claimants scattered throughout the country.107
Since liberty of contract promises no relief, the force of law must be employed to eliminate the waste in the public interest and to protect the property of the common owners. This means legislative compulsion. A model statute for "compulsory co6p-erative development" was framed by a committee of the Amer- 1o6 Agreements satisfactory to lessees' setting, drilling and production programs between large and small tracts in a field may not appeal to a court as satisfying the implied duties of exploration and diligent operations owed to lessors by the individual lessees. See section II, supra.
upon the petition of a majority in a pool and approval by a state body, all producers in the pool could be forced to adhere to a plan curtailing production, conserving gas pressure, and restricting drilling. But the sweep of events has installed a more stringent control under the ordinary proration statutes; states are acting without consulting the wishes of the majority of operators. The inadequacy of such proration measures demonstrates the necessity for more fundamental reorganization of the productive system. The solution is compulsory complete unit operation.
The obvious need is some compulsion, not to insure co6perative development of individual tracts, but to effect scientific production with the entire pool as the unit. The rule of proportionate taking has already been sustained, and the correlative rights of the surface owners in the latent energy of the pool, a common attribute of the entire structure, has been given judicial recognition. Thus, the doctrine that an owner is entitled only to the contents of his acreage, which can now be determined with reasonable accuracy by scientific investigation, is established. Since, paradoxically, these established rights can be protected only by ignoring surface boundaries, it is necessary to allocate the production from the pool to the common owners regardless of the location of the wells.
The legal basis for legislation to effect this is clear. Such legislation can be justified both as an exercise of the police power to protect private property rights and as a conservation measure to eliminate underground waste. If it be challenged as a deprivation of property without due process of law, it can be answered that since it is the most efficient way of extracting oil and gas, it is the most reasonable way to insure each surface owner his full proportionate share. This is not a deprivation of property but a protection of property. It is an old principle of property law that it is "a just and constitutional exercise of the power of the legislature to establish regulations by which adjoining lands, held by various owners in severalty, and in the improvement of which all have a common interest, but which, by reason of the peculiar natural condition of the whole tract cannot be improved or enjoyed by any of them without the concurrence of all, may be reclaimed and made useful to all at their joint expense." 19 In the analogous cases of drainage and irrigation legal problems similar to those of unit operation have been met. Drainage and irrigation ditches are laid out according to the topography of the unit. Drainage, like gas energy, is no respecter of boundary lines; in irrigation projects ratable taking prevails, and the costs are assessed in proportion to the benefit conferred. Land owners are compelled to allow the ditches to be constructed on their land. after satisfies the contractural claims of the lessor, no matter through which conduit the oil and gas is taken from his land. By this means the vicious incidents of the leasing system are eliminated.
Unitization is technologically advisable and legally possible. It provides a fair deal to the public by eliminating waste of an essential economic asset. It provides a fair share to operators and lessors by assuring to each his proportionate share produced with relatively low cost. .It furnishes an efficient engineering control of production. But when a scheme of proration is superimposed upon unit operation to set quotas to meet "reasonable market demands," a potent economic control of supply is created. Controlled supply has a way of affecting prices. A controlled production must therefore be accompanied by a planned price structure to insure a price fair to all. Thus far we have considered only the geologic and legal problems in the rationalization of production. But it is impossible to ignore the fact that the driving force in the industry for stabilization has not been the zeal of the exploiters of oil to conserve supplies of petroleum for future generations but the desire to conserve their fortunes for their descendants. So widely and openly has the economic plight of oil been discussed that, as Judge Hutcheson remarks, the courts might even take judicial notice of the fact that the purpose of proration orders has been to prevent the "loss of market price because of market glut." 114 Governor Murray's edict of martial law as a conservation measure looks strange in the light of his public pronouncement that the wells will reopen for "dollar oil." And the withdrawal of the public domain from further exploitation by the Department of the Interior in 1929 "to meet conditions due to great overproduction" 15 evidences an interesting interpretation of President Hoover's announcement that "there will be complete conservation of Government oil in this administration." 11' Conservation even to statesmen is more a matter of price levels than elimination of wastes.
In the administration of the proration statutes commissions have set field quotas designed to equate production with the anticipated "transportation and marketing facilities." Anticipated facilities have been determined by securing nominations from purchasers of what they expect to buy in the next succeeding month.117 It is this projected demand and not the maximum pipe-line and storage capacity or scientific rate of flow which has set the quota to which supply will be restricted for the month. The power to control the demand to which supply will be pegged is the power to fix prices. The enforcement by the state commissions of the industry's production quotas, while effective in eliminating surface wastes, permits the industry to dictate its own price structure. A petition for reheaying in the Champlin case has been filed charging that the entire oil curtailment program of Oklahoma is a "price-fixing scheme." 1" Thus, while the final decision may well uphold proration, the courts may be forced to hold that the administrative orders of the Corporation Commission go beyond the statute.119
In Texas the new statute provides that "the Commission shall not have power to attempt by order, or otherwise, directly or indirectly, to limit the production of oil to equal the existing market demand for oil." 12T Under this statute, the Railroad Commission first set a daily quota for East Texas of 225 barrels per well on September 2, 1931.121 This was declared temporary pending a finding by the commission of a proper oil-gas ratio. As the number of wells increased, the total output exceeded the anticipated 400,000 barrels daily. Some two weeks later the Commission reduced the per-well quota to 185 barrels, roughly maintaining the 400,000 daily run while still determining the "correct oil-gas ratio. 
